Are Supplemental Flood Claims Subject to the Original One-Year Statute of Limitations?

A recent federal court decision last week in Rosario v. Occidental Fire and Casualty Company of North Carolina ¹ has reignited an important and often misunderstood question regarding “supplemental claims.” Are supplemental flood claims under the National Flood Insurance Program subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as the original claim? The ruling highlights the rigid limitations of federal flood insurance litigation while leaving open intriguing questions about how supplemental claims might be treated if properly pled.

In Rosario, the plaintiff alleged that his insurer breached a Standard Flood Insurance Policy by failing to adequately pay for damages following Hurricane Ian. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was time-barred under the strict one-year statute of limitations imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 4072, triggered by partial denial letters issued in January and August of 2023. The court agreed, holding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely. It emphasized that the statute begins to run upon the date of a written denial or partial denial of the claim, even if the denial is based solely on an adjuster’s report and not on a sworn proof of loss.

This principle, firmly supported by case law in the Middle District of Florida, leaves little room for plaintiffs to delay filing suit once a denial letter has been issued. I wrote about this last month in Partial Denials Start Statute of Limitations Time Clock in National Flood Claims.

The second significant point in the court’s ruling relates to its refusal to consider arguments about supplemental claims and new damages not addressed in the original denials. The policyholder argued that his additional submissions, made after the initial denial letters, should be viewed as separate supplemental claims not subject to the same statute of limitations clock. The court declined to rule on that issue. It found that the complaint itself failed to allege any facts about these supposed supplemental claims, the timing of their submission, or whether they constituted a distinct loss. Because a court’s review at the motion to dismiss stage is confined to the four corners of the complaint, this omission left the issue unresolved.

This is where the case becomes particularly compelling. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed the plaintiff fourteen days to amend. This leaves the door open for the plaintiff to reassert his claims with more specificity, potentially distinguishing supplemental losses as separate from those addressed in the original denials. It also raises the broader question of how courts should treat supplemental claims under the NFIP framework, especially when new damage is discovered, or additional documentation is submitted months after the insurer’s initial determination.

The huge procedural problem on supplemental claims other than the replacement cost claim for benefits after repair or replacement is that most of the time, the proof of loss time period has expired. There is no federal flood rule that allows hidden and undetermined damages to be claimed after the proof of loss time periods lapse. My read from the policyholder’s brief is that these types of “supplemental claims” are at the heart of the policyholder’s argument.

So, back to the question. Are supplemental flood claims subject to the original one-year statute of limitations from the date of a complete or partial denial? For now, the answer remains uncertain, but I am not holding my breath for a ruling helping the policyholder.

What Rosario teaches us is that the answer may hinge less on legal theory and more on pleading precision. Without factual detail linking supplemental submissions to the timing and scope of the original denial and avoiding the proof of loss time limitation, a court may never reach the merits of whether a supplemental claim stands on an independent footing. It’s a reminder that in NFIP litigation, how and when a claim is framed may matter just as much, if not more, than the substance of the claim.

Thought For The Day 

“If you’re early, you’re on time. If you’re on time, you’re late. If you’re late, don’t bother showing up.”
—Vince Lombardi

¹ Rosario v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. Of North Carolina, No. 2:24-cv-1135, 2025 WL 1425461 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2025).