Expert Witness Testimony and the Lack of It Can Lose Property Insurance Cases

A recent appellate decision offers an instructive example of how procedural missteps and insufficient expert disclosures can prove fatal to a policyholder’s insurance claim. ¹ The case arose from property damage allegedly caused by Hurricane Irma in 2017. After a protracted claims and litigation process, the dispute centered not on whether damage occurred, but whether the policyholder could present reliable, admissible evidence through expert witnesses to prove causation and the extent of loss.

The policyholder argued that its primary expert, John Micali, a general contractor with over thirty years of experience, had provided a sound and reliable opinion linking the damage to Hurricane Irma. Micali had performed a visual inspection of the roof, reviewed weather data, and testified that he observed signs consistent with wind damage. He concluded, with what he described as a reasonable degree of professional certainty, that Hurricane Irma caused the damage in question. The policyholder contended that the district court had taken too rigid an approach in applying the Daubert standard for expert admissibility and failed to appreciate the flexibility inherent in that legal framework.

The second expert, Rami Boaziz, was the public adjuster who had worked on the claim and prepared the repair estimate. Although initially disclosed as a fact witness, Boaziz’s affidavit was submitted as part of the opposition to the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, and the policyholder asserted that the insurer would suffer no surprise or prejudice from the admission of his testimony since he had been involved from the beginning of the claims process.

The insurer responded with a firm challenge to the admissibility of both experts. They argued that Micali’s opinion lacked scientific rigor and amounted to nothing more than ipse dixit—“it is so because I say so.” They pointed out that Micali did not conduct any calculations to determine the wind speeds necessary to dislodge the tiles, did not investigate other possible causes of the damage, and had no knowledge of the roof’s pre-loss condition aside from a single satellite photo.

For Boaziz, the insurer emphasized that he had not been disclosed as an expert, had submitted no expert report, and was introduced far too late in the proceedings—after the close of discovery and in response to dispositive motions. According to the insurer, these were textbook violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and merited exclusion of both witnesses. Without admissible expert testimony, they argued, the policyholder could not meet its burden of proof, and summary judgment was appropriate.

The Eleventh Circuit sided entirely with the insurer. In a per curiam opinion, the court upheld the exclusion of Micali’s testimony, finding that his methodology lacked sufficient factual support and failed the reliability standard required under Rule 702 and Daubert. The court noted that expert opinions must be grounded in more than mere experience and that Micali’s failure to rule out other causes, perform technical analysis, or provide pre-loss baseline data rendered his conclusions speculative.

As for Boaziz, the court held that the policyholder’s failure to timely disclose him as an expert, coupled with the absence of an expert report, violated Rule 26. The policyholder’s attempts to reclassify Boaziz as a rebuttal expert were deemed unpersuasive. The court found no substantial justification or harmlessness in the late disclosure.

Because both experts were excluded, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, concluding that the policyholder lacked any admissible evidence to prove that Hurricane Irma caused the claimed damages.

The first lesson is that expert testimony must be both timely and methodologically sound. Courts will not accept expert opinions that rest solely on the expert’s say-so, no matter how experienced they may be. The principles behind the opinion must be testable, supported by sufficient data, and reliably applied.

Second, procedural rules governing expert disclosures must be strictly followed. Listing someone as a fact witness is not enough if they will be relied upon to offer opinion testimony; formal designation as an expert and submission of a Rule 26-compliant report are required. Public adjusters are often fact and opinion witnesses and should be disclosed with more formality if they are offering opinions.

Finally, policyholders should not assume that an insurer’s prior knowledge of a witness’s involvement will excuse procedural deficiencies. Courts have shown increasing willingness to enforce disclosure deadlines and exclude key testimony when those rules are not followed, even when doing so effectively ends the case.

I previously stated in Insurance Coverage Cases Can Be Won or Lost Based on Expert Witnesses and The Preparation of Their Reports and Testimony:

“Without evidence, how can a policyholder win a case? Getting your expert witness thrown out before a trial even starts is like a bomb exploding on your coverage case.”

For those wishing to study these points in further detail, I suggest reading Great Expert Witnesses Are Important to Property Insurance Cases.

Thought For The Day

“Never go to a doctor whose office plants have died. Never trust a witness who smiles during cross-exam.”
—Erma Bombeck

¹ 4539 Pinetree LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 24-12713, 2025 WL 1823127 (11^th Cir. July 2, 2025).